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Articles
The Economic Cost of Alien Tort
Litigation: A Response to Awakening
Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789
Emeka Duruigbo*
"As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."1
INTRODUCTION
Few issues command more attention in scholarly, advocacy,
and policy circles today than the lawsuits brought in the courts
of the United States by foreign claimants seeking redress for in-
ternational law violations by multinational corporations
(MNCs). The principal statutory basis for such suits has been
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), also known as the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), a nineteenth-century piece of legislation
that is playing a major role in modern times.
Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, the statutory
foundation for the federal courts that also regulated their juris-
diction and structure, provided that the federal district courts
* Member of the Bars of Nigeria and California; SPILS & Lieberman Fellow, Stan-
ford Law School and Research Fellow, Program on Energy and Sustainable Devel-
opment, Center for Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford University. I appre-
ciate the comments of Professors Barbara Fried and Thomas Grey and participants
in the Legal Studies Colloquium at Stanford Law School. In the course of preparing
this response, I benefited from the guidance and resourcefulness of Professor Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Visiting Professor at Stanford Law School and Professor Oona
Hathaway of Yale Law School, for which I am grateful. My gratitude also goes to
Lindsay Fain6, James von Geldern and the entire editorial team of the Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade for their highly impressive editing process and excellent
suggestions. The usual caveats, however, apply.
1. Lord Denning, Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, 2 All E.R. 72, 74
(C.A. 1983).
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"shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."2 Congress has re-
codified this alien tort provision a couple of times, with only
slight changes.3 The current version, dating back to a 1948 re-
vision of the Judicial Code, provides that the district courts
"shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."4
An impressive array of publications on the ATS exists. 5 A
very recent, and unarguably unique, addition to this voluminous
list is Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas' Awak-
ening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute Of 1789.6 This book,
which approaches ATS litigation from a business perspective,
debuts on the heels of a battery of sustained attacks on the ATS
by governmental authorities and business interests. 7 This spate
of attacks has sent jitters through, raised the ire of, and pro-
duced angst in the public interest community, which is all too
aware of what can happen when business and political interests
form an alliance to achieve a particular objective.8
Indeed, the current wave of attacks against the ATS is ee-
rily reminiscent of the battle successfully waged by the corpo-
rate sector, with the active cooperation and support of the fed-
eral government, to stop the use of selective purchasing laws to
address human rights abuses in foreign countries. 9 In a 'war'
2. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
3. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
587, 587 n.2 (2002) (citing the 1873 and 1911 re-codifications of the statute).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
5. A search on Westlaw and Lexis Nexis for "ATS," "ATCA," and "Filartiga"
returned over a thousand results.
6. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Institute of International Economics
2003).
7. See infra notes 8 and 16.
8. For a recitation of the attacks from the business sector, see Marcia Coyle,
9th Circuit Spurns U.S. Over Alien Tort Claims, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 2003, at 1,
which details attacks from the Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade
Council, the National Association of Manufacturers, and others.
9. In the days of the apartheid regime in South Africa, campaigns were
launched against corporations doing business with South Africa. The object was to
get them to boycott and consequently coerce the apartheid government to reverse its
despicable policies. In the 1990s, selective purchasing laws resurfaced as tools to
campaign for human rights and fight repressive regimes. In a bid to address the
human rights issues in Burma, the state of Massachusetts enacted a law in 1996,
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that was waged all the way to the United States Supreme
Court, Massachusetts's selective purchasing law was invali-
dated on the ground that federal legislation enacted after the
Massachusetts statute, which authorized the imposition of sanc-
tions on Burma, preempted the state law.10
In a similar vein, at the state level, the Texas Supreme
Court clearly indicated that it was amenable to opening the
doors of Texas courts to foreign victims of corporate violations
and abuses by eliminating the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens11 in personal injury cases. 12 It was met with the resistance
which barred companies doing business with the military regime in Burma from
bidding for large public contracts in Massachusetts. Measures such as this had a
significant level of success. A number of large companies including Apple, Kodak,
Hewlett-Packard, and Philips Electronics were reportedly induced to divest from
Burma because of Massachusetts's selective purchasing law. On the other hand, the
measure also faced formidable challenges. One and a half years after the law took
effect, on January 1, 1997, a consortium of more than 580 businesses launched a
lawsuit against the state on the ground that the law was unconstitutional. On No-
vember 4, 1998, the District Court of Massachusetts felt that it was beyond Massa-
chusetts's jurisdiction to handle issues bordering on foreign policy. Accordingly, it
declared the law an unconstitutional usurpation of the federal government's exclu-
sive authority over matters of foreign relations. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.
See generally Craig Forcese, Municipal Buying Power and Human Rights in Burma.
The Case for Canadian Municipal 'Selective Purchasing' Policies, 56 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 251, 257 (1998); Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts
Challenges the Burmese Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing
Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 374 (1999); Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah,
The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 443 (1998); Harvey Oyer, Note, The Extraterritorial Effects of U.S. Unilateral
Trade Sanctions and Their Impact on U.S. Obligations Under NAFTA, 11 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 429, 450-51 (1997).
10. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000). The Su-
preme Court decided this case on the narrow preemption ground rather than
broader commerce clause and foreign policy grounds, which featured prominently at
both lower courts. See Bernard H. Oxman et al., International Decision: Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 754 (2000); see also Jeffrey
A. Berger, Phoenix Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Changing Preemp-
tion Doctrine on State and Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 941, 954 n.70 (2003); Joshua A. Brook, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to
Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573 (2004); Jonathan Fielding, Enforcing International Labor
Standards through the Use of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Traditional Corporate
Law, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 77 (2004).
11. The doctrine of forum non conveniens presents a mechanism for courts to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction over cases they ordinarily have the power to hear on
the basis that an adequate alternative forum is available elsewhere. See ADRIAN
BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 96 (2002).
12. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 689 (Tex. 1990)
(Hightower, J., concurring); see also Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine
Without A Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 252 n.94 (1990).
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of the business-political alliance. Successful lobbying by busi-
ness groups led to a partial reinstatement of the doctrine by the
Texas legislature. 13
With the preceding background in mind, it is safe to con-
sider Awakening Monster an important piece of work. This Re-
sponse, therefore, proceeds on an understanding of this back-
ground, accentuated by a host of other reasons. In the first
place, it is one of the first monographs on the ATS, a signal of
the growing importance that this piece of legislation has gar-
nered in the short time since its resurrection. 14 Second, this
book appears to fit into the pattern of efforts by business and po-
litical interests to continue to resist ATS litigation. It repre-
sents the concerns of the business community (also shared by
the U.S. government) that the courts have been broadening the
reach of the ATS beyond the statute's original purpose to the
detriment of the economic, political, and national security inter-
ests of the United States. Third, this work is pioneering in its
treatment of the subject primarily from the perspective of eco-
nomic costs. Previous discussions seem to have focused on legal
analysis, foreign policy questions, and the national security im-
plications of ATS litigation. 15
The arrival of the book has been greeted with praise from
the business community, and aversion, revulsion, and derision
from interests that are not closely aligned to business, namely
human rights and consumer protection groups. The pro-
business world has welcomed it as "a highly thoughtful and
well-documented analysis of the damaging consequences these
ATP [Alien Tort Provision] suits could have, not only on the U.S.
economy, but also on the economies of many developing na-
tions," 16 while public interest practitioners have denounced the
13. See Brooke Claggett, Forum Non Conveniens in International Environ-
mental Tort Suits: Closing the Doors of U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs, 9 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 513, 524 (1996).
14. The ATS was largely buried, until it was brought back from near death
about two and half decades ago. See Anthony D'Amato, Preface to THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMs ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, at vii (Ralph G. Steinhardt et al. eds.,
1999) (stating that the ATS "was adopted by the first Congress in 1789 and promptly
went into hibernation for nearly two centuries").
15. But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litiga-
tion, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001) (discussing the costs of ATS litigation on U.S. for-
eign relations, U.S. democracy and costs to the international system with secondary
implications for trade policy and environmental protection, among others).
16. Press Release, USA*Engage, USA*Engage Hails IE Study Finding that
Alien Tort Lawsuits Pose Real Threat to Global Economy (quoting Bill Reinsch,
President of the National Foreign Trade Council and Co-Chairman of USA*Engage)
[Vol. 14:1
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work as "guesswork17 and "lacking in credibility."'18  In the
course of this Response, prevailing notions, arguments, and
counter-arguments on alien tort litigation will be examined.
To undertake the monumental task that is required, the
present Response is organized into four major parts. Part I pre-
sents a background to the Alien Tort Statute. The objective of
this section is to provide a helpful insight into the overall con-
text of the present discussion. Part II consists of an overview of
Awakening Monster and a discussion of some of the contentious
issues raised in the book. Part III considers and critiques the
authors' policy proposals, the most important of which is Con-
gressional action to limit the application of the ATS. It also
suggests alternatives. Part IV is the conclusion.
I. ALIEN TORT STATUTE: A BACKGROUND
The history of the Alien Tort Statute is shrouded in mys-
tery. 19 As one writer puts it, "[t]he ATCA has no explicit legisla-
tive history."20 Controversy has centered on the original intent
of the lawmakers and what the statute was designed to
achieve.21 One contention is that the intention of Congress in
enacting the legislation was the provision of jurisdiction over
prize cases.22 Some scholars, however, favor an interpretation
at http://www.usaengage.org/press-releases/2003/20030724%20atsstudy.html
(July 24, 2003).
17. Katrin Dauenhauer, Human Rights Experts Defend Law from Business At-
tack, INTER PRESS SERVICE (quoting Sugundo Llorens of the International Labor
Rights Fund) at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2003/0730refute.htm
(July 29, 2003).
18. Id. (quoting Jo Marie Griesgraber of Oxfam America) at http://www.global
policy.org/intljustice/atca/2003/0730refute.htm.
19. EMEKA A. DURUIGBO, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 164
(2003). As Judge Friendly puts it, the statute is "a kind of legal Lohengrin... no
one seems to know whence it came." IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975).
20. Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multina-
tional Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH.
U.L. REV. 881, 886 n.23 (1999); see also Donald J. Kochan, Constitutional Structure
as a Limitation on the Scope of the "Law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153, 161 n.47 (1998).
21. See David I. Becker, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183, 189 (1998); Jeffrey Rabkin, Universal Justice: The Role of
the Federal Courts in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2123-
24 (1995); Courtney Shaw, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1386-86 (2002).
22. Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations,
20041
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of the statute that is liberal enough to accommodate the expand-
ing international legal and moral obligations of the United
States. 23 Regardless of what side one comes down on in this
controversy, one incontrovertible fact is that this piece of legis-
lation remained in near-total obscurity until a few decades ago
when it was exhumed to assume an important role: a veritable
instrument for addressing pressing needs in the world.
The modern history of the ATS thus dates back to 1980,
when it was utilized in holding a former Paraguayan police offi-
cer liable for torture committed while serving in Paraguay. 24 In
that case, the plaintiffs, Dr. Filartiga and his daughter, alleged
human rights abuses, particularly torture by a former inspector
general of police in Paraguay, which led to the death of Dr. Fi-
lartiga's son.25 The court exercised jurisdiction and awarded
damages of $10 million against Inspector General Pena.26 It is
hard to overstate the importance of this case. 27 Indeed, the im-
plications and ramifications of the Filartiga decision were con-
sidered so phenomenal that Professor Harold Koh dubbed it the
Brown v. Board of Education of "transnational public liti-
gat [ion] ."28
For some time, use of the ATS remained limited to cases in-
volving agents of the state who abused the power of government
to oppress their people, often with impunity. 29 The situation
changed in the mid-1990s, 30 however, when a lawsuit was
18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1995).
23. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 493 (1989).
24. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For an extensive and
exhaustive discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga, see Jeffrey M.
Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 53 (1981). For a recent recounting of the case by one of the plaintiffs, see
Dolly Filartiga, American Courts, Global Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2004, at
A21.
25. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
26. Id. at 888-89.
27. See David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign
Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255, 256
(1995-96) ("In a sense, all current human rights litigation owes its fortune to Filar-
tiga.").
28. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2366 (1991).
29. Examples of such cases include those brought against Karazdic and the Es-
tate of Marcos.
30. It should be noted that this type of non-corporate ATS case has continued
to receive attention, notwithstanding the expansion to cases against corporations.
In October 2003, a federal jury in Miami, relying in part on the ATS, awarded $4
[Vol. 14:1
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launched against the California-based oil corporation, Unocal. 31
That case enunciated the principle that a federal court can exer-
cise subject matter jurisdiction over improprieties and human
rights abuses involving multinational corporations in joint ven-
tures with foreign dictatorial governments. 32 The Unocal case
opened the floodgates in this arena, so much so that in recent
times, ATS jurisprudence has been dominated by cases alleging
human rights, labor, and environmental abuses by multina-
tional corporations operating in the developing world.33
Notwithstanding that lawsuits brought against corporations
under the ATS are still in their rudimentary stages, anti-
corporate ATS litigation has sent some shockwaves through the
business community. Corporations have voiced their opposition
to the current state of affairs. Opposition has been led by the
National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), (which was at the fore-
front of the successful business attack against selective purchas-
ing laws), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Council of
International Business, and the International Chamber of
Commerce. 34 While some of the attackers have made alarmist
statements and reported half-truths,35 there remains some basis
for concern that litigation under the ATS may have a negative
million in compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs in the first U.S. civil
jury verdict for crimes against humanity. See Josh Richman, Bay Area Family Wins
Chilean 'Atrocity' Suit: First U.S. Civil Jury Verdict for Crimes Against Humanity,
OAKLAND TRIB., October 16, 2003.
31. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Tobias Bar-
rington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002).
32. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 880.
33. Up to fifty lawsuits have been brought against MNCs under the ATS. See
LINDA A. WILLETT ET AL., THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (National Center for the Public Interest 2003);
Kenny Bruno, De-Globalizing Justice: The Corporate Campaign to Strip Foreign Vic-
tims of Corporate-Induced Human Rights Violations of the Right to Sue in U.S.
Courts, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, March 2003, at 13.
34. See Bruno, supra note 33, at 16; Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact from
Fiction in the Debate over Application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of
Fundamental Human Rights by Corporations, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 563 (2003).
35. See Bruno, supra note 33, at 16 (stating that John Howard of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce wrote an article, subtitled Is Our Litigation Run-Amok Going
Global?, in which he lamented that under current U.S. law, foreigners could sue
companies that simply carried on business, paid taxes, and were in compliance with
the laws of their host countries where atrocities were alleged to have been commit-
ted). The truth is that no company has been attacked for the reasons he stated. In-
stead, corporations have been sued for playing a role in those atrocities. See John E.
Howard, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok Going Global?,
UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, at http://www.uschamber.comlpress/opeds
/0210howarditigation.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
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impact on business. The business sector, according to the
NFTC, has outlined three possible approaches for undermining
the way the ATS is currently being used. These approaches in-
clude seeking legislative amendments limiting the use of the
ATS, mounting a judicial challenge to the present interpretation
of the statute at the Supreme Court, and getting the Executive
Branch to write a generic letter that objects to ATS suits for in-
terference with U.S. foreign policy-making. 36
The U.S. government has also stepped in to oppose these
suits and align its interests with those of the business sector.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed amicus briefs in ATS
suits urging courts to reconsider previous interpretations of the
ATS.3v Upon the urging of the courts, the State Department has
also expressed its opinion in letters discouraging the continua-
tion of ATS suits in the Exxon Mobil38 and Rio Tinto39 cases on
the ground that they would interfere with the war on terror-
ism. 40 Awakening Monster joins the chorus of those objecting to
the current use of the ATS. The next part of this Response dis-
cusses some of the important arguments contained in the book,
which form the basis of the recommendations discussed in Part
III.
II. AWAKENING MONSTER: AN OVERVIEW
Aggravating the apprehension and exasperation that has
visited the pro-ATS community as a result of the relentless at-
tacks on the statute, a new addition to the list of ATS opponents
emerged in July 2003. Awakening Monster is organized into
eight chapters. It begins by asserting that a "one-sentence law,"
the ATS, could cause a nightmare scenario to become a reality.41
The scenario is as follows:
Within the next decade, 100,000 class action Chinese plain-
36. See Bruno, supra note 33.
37. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
38. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1: 01-cv-01357-LFO (D.D.C. filed June 20,
2001).
39. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
40. See Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Louis F. Oberdorfer, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia (July 29, 2002), available at www.laborrights.org (last visited Sept.
19, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from William H. Taft, IV]. For an illuminating discus-
sion of Executive Opinions in ATS cases, see Brian C. Free, Awaiting Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp.: Advocating the Cautious Use of Executive Opinions in Alien Tort Claims
Act Litigation, 12 PAC. RiM. L. & POL'Y J. 467 (2003).
41. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 1.
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tiffs, organized by New York trial lawyers, could sue General
Motors, Toyota, General Electric, Mitsubishi, and a host of other
blue-chip corporations in U.S. federal court for abetting China's
denial of political rights, for observing China's restrictions on
trade unions, and for impairing the Chinese environment. 42
These plaintiffs might claim actual damages of $6 billion and
punitive damages of $20 billion.43 Similar blockbuster cases are
already working their way through federal and state court sys-
tems. 44 The authors believe that the nightmare could become a
reality if the ATS is interpreted not only to confer jurisdiction on
federal courts, but also to create a cause of action to apply inter-
national law. 45 They address the question of application of un-
ratified treaties and conventions in the United States. 46 The
book also looks at the implications of the ATS brand of interna-
tional civil litigation on foreign policy and the war on terror-
ism. 47 The economic costs of alien tort litigation are also exam-
ined. 48 These issues are reviewed more closely in the following
sections.49
A. ALIEN TORT STATUTE: CAUSE OF ACTION OR JURISDICTIONAL
GRANT ONLY?
The authors subscribe to the view that the ATS is essen-
tially a jurisdictional statute. 50 They do not mask their dislike
for the current approach in which the ATS creates a cause of ac-
tion by itself. They therefore seek to dismantle it:
We urge the State, Treasury, and Justice Departments to issue a joint





46. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 7-9.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 37-43.
49. The central arguments of the authors echo sentiments of other people who
share their ideological position on the ATS. For instance, Daniel Griswold of the lib-
ertarian CATO Institute has stated that the "misuse of the [ATS] constitutes bad
law, bad economics, and bad foreign policy," adding that the "unjust wielding of the
ATCA threatens to damage the U.S. economy and the often underdeveloped econo-
mies of the host countries." Daniel Griswold, Abuse of 18th Century Law Threatens
U.S. Economic and.Security Interests, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, February 5, 2003, at
A15.
50. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 3 ("Before Filartiga, the ATS
was rarely invoked by plaintiffs. Even then, the general view was that the ATS was
principally a jurisdictional statute.").
2004]
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jurisdictional statute, limiting causes of action to those contemplated
in 1789, until Congress enacts additional substantive standards for
alien tort claims and enumerates further causes of action. This is the
interpretation urged by Judges Bork and Randolph. This is the posi-
tion advocated by the Justice Department in its Unocal brief, filed in
May 2003.51
The authors, however, make little effort to engage in a rig-
orous analysis of the historical and legal arguments surround-
ing this issue. A possible explanation for the approach they
adopted is that they did not set out to write a legal treatise, but
rather, sought to concentrate on the economic implications of
the current wave of litigation under the ATS.
The question of whether the Alien Tort Statute provides a
cause of action, or provides jurisdiction only for causes of action
established by other instruments, is fundamental. To under-
score its importance, many who believe that the statute provides
more than a jurisdictional grant refer to it as the "Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA)," while some of their opponents and some
neutral observers settle for the term "Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)."52 The distinction is not merely academic and certainly
goes beyond a choice of nomenclature. If the statute is con-
strued as not providing a cause of action, it could spell doom for
alien tort litigation as we currently know it.
Explicitly construing the ATS as granting a statutory cause
of action is a relatively recent development. The Filartiga deci-
sion that pioneered modern alien tort litigation did not construe
the ATS as granting a cause of action, although it erroneously
has been viewed as so holding in both judicial53 and academic
circles.5 4 The overwhelming majority of decisions after Filartiga
have held that the statute creates a cause of action as well as
51. Id. at 52.
52. Bradley, supra note 3, at 592-93 ('Moreover, human rights advocates now
commonly refer to the statute as the 'Alien Tort Claims Act,' a title suggesting that
the statute is more than just a jurisdictional provision."); see also Elliot J. Schrage,
Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 153, 157 n.11. This Response uses the term "Alien Tort Statute" and the abbre-
viation "ATS" for convenience only. See id.
53. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We thus join
the Second Circuit [in Filartiga] in concluding that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1350, creates a cause of action ...."); see Bradley, supra note 3, at 592 n.21 ("In
adopting the cause of action construction of the Statute, the Ninth Circuit appears to
have been under the erroneous belief that the Second Circuit had already adopted
this construction in Filartiga.").
54. See, e.g., Schrage, supra note 52, at 157 n.ll (stating that Filartiga found
the ATS "to provide a statutory cause of action").
[Vol. 14:1
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granting subject matter jurisdiction. 55
While the cause of action construction of the ATS has re-
ceived enormous judicial support, its correctness has been the
source of intense dispute. According to Professor William Casto,
"[A]ny suggestion that the statute creates a federal cause of ac-
tion is simply frivolous." 56 In an amicus brief filed in the Ninth
Circuit in Doe v. Unocal, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
latches onto this point, impressing upon the court that its previ-
ous construction of the statute as granting a cause of action was
in error.57 The DOJ relied on the opinions of two judges who in
separate cases reasoned that the ATS was only a jurisdictional
grant. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 58 Judge Bork
stated, "it is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause
of action before a private plaintiff [can] be allowed to enforce
principles of international law in a federal tribunal."59 Judge
Randolph adopted a similar line of reasoning in Al Odah v.
United States.60
Proponents of the cause of action construction reject the "ju-
risdiction only" logic. A number of people have explicitly or im-
plicitly rejected Judge Bork's position on the law of nations or
its application in the courts of the United States. 61 Attorneys
55. See Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258
(N.D. Ala. 2003) ("[T]he ATCA 'creates both subject matter jurisdiction and a private
right of action."'); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ('The ATCA provides a cause of action in tort for
breaches of international law."); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
("The plain language of the [ATCA] and the use of the words 'committed in violation'
strongly implies that a well pled tort if committed in violation of the law of nations,
would be sufficient [to give rise to a cause of action]."); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48 (11th Cir.
1996); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2001);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
56. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479-480
(1986).
57. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America at 8, Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628) ('The court should now ex-
amine the issue in this en banc proceeding and should overrule Trajano and Hilao
because they erroneously read the ATS as providing, or permitting a court to infer, a
private right of action.") [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of Amer-
ica].
58. 726 F. 2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 801.
60. 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
61. See Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers: Judge Bork's
Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985);
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
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for the appellants in Doe v. Unocal reject the DOJ's contention,
stating "if the Act had been intended to be purely jurisdictional,
it would have been meaningless when it was enacted."62 In an
amici brief by international law scholars and human rights or-
ganizations in support of plaintiffs in Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,63 amici responded to the DOJ's
brief in Doe v. Unocal, which was submitted by the Talisman de-
fendant. In the amicus brief, the scholars and organizations ar-
gue that "the Justice Department's current insistence that the
ATCA does not contain an explicit cause of action would have
mystified [eighteenth] century lawyers, who understood the law
of nations to be part of American law and therefore available to
claimants whose rights under that law had been abridged."64
The amicus brief in the Talisman case also challenges the
DOJ position on the grounds that the government's position has
met rejection in every court that has had the opportunity to ad-
dress the issue.6  Seeking to bolster an argument by relying on
cases that the DOJ claims were decided in error, however, begs
the question. If the cases were wrongly decided in the face of
stronger arguments, the Supreme Court or the circuit courts can
overturn the decisions.
The international law scholars and human rights organiza-
tions in their amicus brief also discount the reasoning that the
ATS does not grant a cause of action, arguing that the very no-
tion of a "cause of action" did not enter the legal lexicon of the
United States until almost sixty years after the ATS was
adopted. 66 With due respect, this argument is not persuasive.
'Originalists', 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).
62. Appellant's Brief at 12, Unocal (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). Support for this
position can be found in the opinion of the district court in Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reconsidered on other grounds, 694 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
It is unnecessary that plaintiffs establish the existence of an independent,
express right of action, since the law of nations clearly does not create or
define civil actions, and to require such an explicit grant under interna-
tional law would effectively nullify that portion of the statute which confers
jurisdiction over tort suits involving the law of nations.
Id.
63. Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Or-
ganizations in Support of Plaintiffs, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman En-
ergy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 01 Civ. 9882) [hereinafter Brief
of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Organizations].
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 9.
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The critical issue is whether statutes passed before the emer-
gence of the term were worded differently from the ATS, so that
one could conclude from the wording that the statute granted
jurisdiction only or accompanied it with additional authority.
Conversely, the argument could be buttressed with instances of
similarly worded enactments being construed as granting a
cause of action. As Professor Casto has noted, the language
used by the First Congress in the Alien Tort Statute- particu-
larly the use of the word "cognizance" which "refer[red] to a
court's power to try a case" -was quite different from the lan-
guage it used in statutes that created causes of action.67 One
example is the copyright statute, which provides that copyright
infringers would be "liable to suffer and pay to the said author
or proprietor all damages occasioned by such injury, to be recov-
ered by a special action on the case founded upon this act, in
any court having cognizance thereof."68
The above point is confirmed by the fact that the first re-
codification of the ATS in 1873, and all subsequent recodifica-
tions have replaced "cognizance" with the word "jurisdiction."
Prior to the recent controversies, this change in language was
never viewed as evincing an intention to alter the scope of the
ATS. 69 Professor Curtis Bradley notes that "historical" support
for the cause of action construction of the Alien Tort Statute is
virtually nonexistent save for an Attorney General opinion is-
sued in 1907.70 Professor Bradley aligns with Professor Casto's
statement, which seeks to minimize the import of the opinion by
describing it as a "sloppy reference to the federal courts' juris-
diction and not to the existence of a statutory cause of action." 71
Professor Bradley is therefore unequivocal in the belief that "the
First Congress did not intend in the Alien Tort Statute to create
a federal statutory cause of action."72
Nevertheless, proponents insist that the Statute did just
67. Casto, supra note 56, at 479.
68. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125-26 (1790); see Bradley, su-
pra note 3, at 594 n.26.
69. Bradley, supra note 3, at 594.
70. The Attorney General stated that the Alien Tort Statute "provide[s] a fo-
rum and a right of action" when citizens of a foreign country bring suit for damages
caused in Mexico by the tortious diversion of water in the Rio Grande river, so long
as the act is in violation of the law of nations. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907). In
Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards relied on this Attorney General opinion in support of his
claim that the statute creates a statutory cause of action. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
71. Bradley, supra note 3, at 596 (quoting Casto, supra note 56, at 479 n.58).
72. Id. at 597.
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that. They contend that the 1992 Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA),73 passed almost two hundred years after the ATS, con-
firmed the belief that the ATS created a cause of action based in
customary international law.7 4 As the name indicates, TVPA
gave victims of torture, American citizens and noncitizens alike,
the ability to bring civil actions against the perpetrators of tor-
ture and extra-judicial killings.7 5 While the TVPA could be read
as providing clarity and constraint by explicitly providing a sub-
stantive cause of action and specifying the matters into which
the courts may legitimately inquire, a different reading is that it
seeks to lay the debate to rest for those judges who doubted
whether torture and other violations of international law can be
grounds for civil liability in the United States.
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks find specific evidence in
the TVPA that Congress was authorizing the application of the
Filartiga doctrine.76 Construing the TVPA as an act of legisla-
tive redundancy, 77 Goodman and Jinks assert that "Congress in-
tended the TVPA not to replace, but rather to solidify and ex-
tend, the ATCA's coverage. Accordingly, Congress stipulated
two specific causes of action.., and purposefully left the ATCA
intact to continue the broader Filartiga doctrine's causes of ac-
tion."78
In, support of their position, the scholars place an over-
whelming reliance on TVPA's legislative history. That history
clearly suggests that Congress was responding to doubts raised
(particularly by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren) about the ATS's valid-
ity as a basis for bringing lawsuits for international law viola-
tions in the absence of a separate congressional authorization.
Thus, as one writer views it, "While giving Judge Bork the ex-
pression of legislative intent upon which he had insisted, Con-
gress also admonished him that he was wrong to require it in
the first place." 79 Support for this reading can be found in the
words of TVPA's principal sponsor, Senator Arlen Specter.80
73. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 1992.
74. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
75. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
1992.
76. Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 514 (1997).
77. Id. at 522 ("Congress considered its legislative action to be redundant.").
78. Id. at 514.
79. Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection Act,
11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 284 (1994).
80. Quoted in Goodman & Jinks, supra note 76, at 522 ("One might think.., it
would be unnecessary to have legislation on such a subject, because torture is such a
[Vol. 14:1
ALIEN TORT LITIGATION
Insisting that the ATS provided a statutory cause of action
and that the TVPA ratified and modernized it, Goodman and
Jinks refer to a statement from the House Report: "The TVPA
would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause
of action that has been successfully maintained under an exist-
ing law, [the ATCA]. Section 1350 has other important uses and
should not be replaced."81 This position was also adopted by a
group of distinguished law professors in an amicus brief submit-
ted to the Supreme Court in Karadzic v. Doe:
Congress erased all doubt about the effect of the ATCA to authorize
suit when it enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991....
Both the House and Senate Reports expressly evince Congress's un-
derstanding that a "remedy" for such offenses was "already available"
to aliens under the ATCA. Further, the legislative history emphasizes
that the ATCA "should remain intact to permit suits based on other
norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of cus-
tomary international law.
82
Apparently, they spoke too soon, for doubts still remain.
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith subscribe to the
first interpretation earlier mentioned.8 3 They do not seem to
place as much import on statements contained in the legislative
history of the TVPA, and to the extent they do, they view them
as harboring ambiguities as to the endorsement of the Filartiga
position.8 4 They also argue that if it is indeed true that Con-
gress intended to endorse the Filartiga logic, there should be no
resistance to a requirement that "Congress express this ap-
proval in a statute rather than in ambiguous legislative his-
tory."8 5 Bradley and Goldsmith accept the premise that Judge
Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren was "a proximate cause of the
TVPA," and refer to his position that ATS jurisdiction was de-
pendent on the existence of a cause of action in a separate stat-
ute or treaty or customary international law.8 6 Judge Bork had
not found any instrument that contained such a cause of action,
and decided not to infer one so as to avoid a potential interfer-
heinous offense, such a heinous crime, that the courts would have jurisdiction with-
out a formal legislative measure. This is necessary because of litigated cases in the
field, most particularly [Tel-Oren].").
81. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-367(), at 3 (1991)).
82. Id. at 526 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Professors David E. Bederman et
al., at 9-10, Karadzic v. Doe (No. 95-1599)).
83. See supra notes 50-54, 58-60 and accompanying text.
84. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, The Current Illegitimacy of In-
ternational Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM LAW REV. 319, 363-64 (1997).
85. Id. at 368.
86. Id. at 363.
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ence with the conduct of foreign relations by the political
branches.8 7 Bradley and Goldsmith add: "Instead, [Judge Bork]
argued, the court should wait for 'affirmative action by Con-
gress' before applying the 1789 ATS to modern human rights
litigation that the drafters of the Act could not have contem-
plated. Congress provided this affirmative action in the
TVPA."s8
The contention that the original intent of the ATS was to
provide jurisdiction only and not to create a statutory cause of
action is on firm ground, notwithstanding judicial opinions to
the contrary. It is a testament to the strength of this position
that even formidable adversaries concede that their opponents
may be right on this score. Professor Michael Collins put it this
way: "I agree that the ATS does not itself create a federal cause
of action."8 9 Professor William Dodge concurs, but proffers some
explanation, including the point that the requirement of a cause
of action was a more recent entrant in the legal domain:
I agree that the First Congress probably viewed the Alien Tort Statute
in purely jurisdictional terms, but Bradley's discussion of this question
masks two important points. First, the reason the members of the
First Congress did not provide a statutory cause of action for alien tort
suits is that it would not have occurred to them that cause of action
was necessary. The requirement of a cause of action did not enter
American law until 1848. The First Congress assumed that torts in
violation of the law of nations would be cognizable at common law, just
as any other tort would be. Yet Judge Bork and Professor Bradley
among others have argued that a cause of action should be required in
alien tort suits. I have previously pointed out that such arguments are
ahistorical. Indeed, the reason federal courts have, quite properly,
read the Alien Tort Statute as granting a cause of action is precisely to
eliminate this anachronism. Second, even if Congress did not intend
the Alien Tort Statute itself to be a "Law [...] of the United States"
under which cases might arise for the purposes of Article III, Congress
could have enacted such a law if it so desired. 90
I have already considered-and rejected-the argument
that the requirement of cause of action needed to exist in the
eighteenth-century to conclude that a statute passed then au-
thorized litigants to commence an action under it.91 I find, how-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 363-64.
89. Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 649, 671 n.105 (2002).
90. William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Ob-
servations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 690 (2002).
91. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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ever, the argument that the First Congress did not consider it
necessary to grant a statutory cause of action is plausible. The
specific reason why they chose not to do so is difficult to deci-
pher. After all, as Professor Burley has noted, "definitive proof
of the intended purpose and scope of the [ATS] is impossible."92
Supreme Court watchers expected the high court to put this
matter to rest in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which was argued be-
fore the court in March 2004.93 In a decision handed down on
June 29, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the ATS is a juris-
dictional statute in the sense that it only addresses the power of
courts to entertain certain claims and does not create a statu-
tory cause of action for aliens.94 The Court went further to add,
however, that notwithstanding the fact the ATS is a jurisdic-
tional statute, creating no statutory cause of action for aliens,
"[t]here is too much in the historical record to believe that Con-
gress would have enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow
indefinitely."95 Accordingly, Justice Souter, writing for the ma-
jority, favored and adopted the inference that "Congress in-
tended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations."96 In-
cluded in this limited list are offenses against ambassadors, vio-
lations of safe conduct, and individual actions arising out of
prize captures and piracy.97
The Court, nevertheless, admonished district courts to exer-
cise caution in deciding to hear the type of ATS claims being
brought in the courts today, stating that acceptable claims must
be defined with the level of specificity that is comparable to the
cases brought for offenses against ambassadors, violations of
safe conduct, and piracy that Congress had in mind in the eight-
eenth century when it enacted the ATS.98 The Court added that
it was not within the province of the district courts to seek out
and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations. 99
Total clarity has not yet emerged on this issue.10 0 The con-
92. Burley, supra note 23, at 463.
93. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). For a report and commen-
tary on the Supreme Court hearing, see Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Case
About Foreigners' Use of Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A16; Legal
Action Over Foreign Misdeeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A20.
94. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2739.




99. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2759.
100. Linda Greenhouse, Same Justices, New Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2004, at
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troversy lingers, as divergent interest groups find something in
the Supreme Court decision to claim victory for their position. 101
Moreover, there is the pertinent and persistent question as to
whether the decision extends to corporations.10 2
B. APPLICATION OF UNRATIFIED TREATIES THROUGH THE
COURTS
The authors also navigate the murky waters of treaty ratifi-
cation and application of unratified treaties through alien tort
litigation. 103
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto (221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 [C.D. Cal. 20021), the
federal district court held that the MNC could be held liable (by a for-
eigner, not a U.S. citizen) for violating the United Nations Convention
of the Law of the Sea, even though the United States has declined to
A16 (noting that the decision "left many unanswered questions about the full reach
of the statute").
101. See Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Alien Tort Claims Act a Powerful Human
Rights Tool?, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/12/sebok.alien.tort.claims/
(July 12, 2004); Jacqueline Koch, Not in Their Backyard, Corpwatch, at
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11441 (July 14, 2004).
102. William Baue, Does Supreme Court Validation of Alien Tort Claims Act Ap-
ply to Corporations?, SRI NEWS, available at http://www.socialfunds.comlnews/
article.cgi11458.html (July 1, 2004).
103. For a sampling of this controversial debate, see Lea Brilmayer, Federalism,
State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SuP. CT. REV.
295, 324 n.87. "It is not fatal to international law based arguments that the nation
has not signed the relevant conventions. Human rights norms, in particular, have in
some cases entered the realm of customary international law as to states that have
not signed the relevant international agreements." Id.; see Anne Bayefsky & Joan
Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States Courts: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1992); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 87 (1992) (stating that customary international law is being
applied in "compensat[ion] for the abstinence of the United States vis-A-vis ratifica-
tion of international human rights treaties"). Professor Lillich has observed as fol-
lows:
Although Article VI, section 2 of the Constitution makes treaties the su-
preme law of the land, the United States always can avoid or lessen the
domestic impact of human rights treaties by failing to ratify them or by
ratifying them subject to non-self-executing declarations. However, cus-
tomary international law, at least where the United States has not persis-
tently objected to a particular norm during the process of its formation,
ipso facto becomes supreme federal law and hence may regulate activities,
relations or interests within the United States.... Thus, the potential im-
pact of customary international human rights law upon the American legal
system is substantial.
Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851, 856-57 (1989).
[Vol. 14:1
ALIEN TORT LITIGATION
ratify the treaty. Under that reasoning, U.S.-based MNCs could be
held liable under the ATS for violations of the Kyoto Protocol, the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other trea-
ties the United States has not ratified, on the theory that the treaty
norms have become part of the law of nations. By the same theory, a
firm could be held liable for violating a ratified treaty, such as the [In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], that was not self-
executing because Congress has yet to pass enabling legislation.10 4
The Justice Department makes a similar contention in the
amicus brief in the Unocal case. The brief disagrees with the
court for finding an implied right of action for the enforcement
of rights anchored on "international agreements that the United
States has refused to join, nonbinding agreements, and agree-
ments that are not self-executing, as well as political resolutions
of UN [United Nation] bodies and other non-binding state-
ments."10 5
A fundamental principle of international law is that a
treaty binds only the parties to it.106 A party signifies its inter-
est to be a part of a treaty regime by consent manifested
through appending its signature to the treaty and deposit of in-
struments of ratification (or accession if the treaty has already
entered into force). Moreover, a treaty does not create rights
and obligations for third parties without their consent. 107 These
principles are founded on the principle of state sovereignty.108
104. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 8.
105. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America, supra note 57, at 14.
106. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(6th ed. 2003).
107. The principle of pacta tertilis nec nocent nec prosunt is the basis of the rule
that treaties bind only parties thereto and cannot bind third parties without their
consent. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (4th ed. 1997).
The general rule is that international agreements bind only the parties to
them. The reasons for this rule can be found in the fundamental principles
of the sovereignty and independence of states, which posit that states must
consent before they can be bound by them. This, of course, is a general
proposition and is not necessarily true in all cases. However, it does remain
as a basic line of approach in international law.
Id.
108. The International Court of Justice declared in Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 133 (June 27) that "the whole of interna-
tional law" is anchored upon the "fundamental principle of sovereignty." See also
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); STATE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Gerad Kreijen et al. eds., 2002);
John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2003); Elizabeth E. Ruddick, Note, The Continuing Constraint of
Sovereignty: International Law, International Protection, and the Internally Dis-
placed, 77 B.U.L. REV. 429 (1997).
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Where a State has refused to join a treaty or expressed reserva-
tions to parts thereof, the provisions of the treaty or the re-
served portions are inapplicable to that State. Courts would
therefore be in error to apply such treaties or the provisions that
have been reserved. Norms of customary international law to
which a state has consistently objected are also not binding on
the persistent objector. 10 9 Similarly, resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly generally are not legally binding. 110
Those resolutions are often referred to as "soft law," a misno-
mer, since they are really not law.111 Courts should therefore
not impose them on States.
The problem, however, is that the legal attacks and the au-
thors' charges may be founded on shaky ground. Treaties often
contain provisions that have already become customary interna-
tional law. Their incorporation into treaties does not destroy
their original character as international customs. In such cases,
the courts are really applying customary international law, not
the treaties per se. This point was also addressed by the inter-
national law scholars and human rights organizations who
stated that the statute "does not and cannot enforce unratified
or non-self-executing treaties. Nor does it convert non-binding
resolutions of the United Nations into law."112
Professor Gerald Neuman has also addressed this issue in
response to the charge by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith
that the modern application of customary international law
seeks to circumvent deliberate decisions of the President and
the Senate to prevent the enforcement of certain human rights
norms through a declaration that those treaties are non-self-
executing. 1 3 Professor Neuman agrees that it is not proper for
109. A tricky issue arises where a State has not persistently objected to a norm
of customary international law, but has also not accepted the practice. Thus, the
State has chosen to remain neutral. A critical question is whether a particular norm
is also binding on such a State. See arguments cited supra note 103.
110. See Jack M. Beard, America's New War On Terror: The Case For Self-
Defense Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 580 n.72 (2001).
111. For discussion on the concept of soft law, its evolution and significance, see
Linda C. Reif, International Environmental and Human Rights Law: The Role of
Soft Law in the Evolution of Procedural Rights to Information, Participation in Deci-
sionmaking, and Access to Domestic Remedies in Environmental Matters, in
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: RELEVANCE TO
DOMESTIC LAW AND POLICY 73 (M. Young & Y. Iwasawa eds., 1996); C. M. Chinkin,
The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989).
112. Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Or-
ganizations, supra note 63, at 18.
113. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
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courts to do so, citing the express invocation of the Restatement
on Foreign Relations, that only genuine norms of customary in-
ternational law and those validly binding on the United States
may be applied. 114 There is therefore no room for the enforce-
ment of the so-called "emerging norms" of customary interna-
tional law. 115
The authors could not have chosen a more inapt treaty for
their illustration. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 16 is well known as a codification of customary
international law. 117 It is true that some of its provisions, such
as Part XI dealing with deep seabed mining, sought to create
new international law."l8 But many of the provisions, such as
those on the Exclusive Economic Zone, reflect widely accepted
international practice. 119 The Kyoto Protocol, 120 also cited by
the authors, will not be applied on that same basis, in so far as
it is not a codification of customary international law. 12' More
importantly, claims founded on that protocol face a huge risk of
being rejected, as the courts have been reluctant to extend the
use of the ATS to "ecological genocide" or any other form of envi-
ronmental claims.122
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815,
869-70 (1997).
114. See Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 387
(1997).
115. Id.
116. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982).
117. See Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, Marine Pollution Control: UNCLOS III
as the Partial Codification of International Practice, 7 ENVTL. POLY & L. 71, 73
(1981).
118. For a discussion of Part XI and the obstacles it created to ratification of the
treaty, see SAID MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING (1987); Jonathan
Charney, U.S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 AM. J.
INVL L. 705 (1994).
119. For a comprehensive discussion of the Exclusive Economic Zone, see DAVID
ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1987).
120. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
121. Id.
122. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Amlon
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Richard Herz,
Text of Remarks on Panel: "Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Torts and Cultural
Genocide," 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 503, 505 (2001); Cyril Kormos et al.,
U.S. Participation in International Environmental Law and Policy, 13 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 661 (2001). Some scholars, however, believe that such claims should
be allowed and may even succeed if properly and narrowly pleaded. See Richard L.
Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical
Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000); Martin Wagner, The International Legal
2004]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
C. CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND CONCERNS ABOUT
TERRORISM
Critics of the current use of the ATS also assail it on the ba-
sis that it engages the courts in foreign policy-making, 123 and
could potentially embroil the United States in controversies and
disputes with foreign governments. Of late, an additional but
related charge has surfaced: ATS litigation could frustrate ef-
forts at fighting the war against international terrorism. The
authors do not forget to visit this issue:
In ATS cases, the decision essentially amounts to a judgment on the
actions of a foreign state. Even when foreign citizens sue private ac-
tors, the judgments almost always question foreign state conduct.
Such litigation interferes with the executive conduct of foreign affairs
and may well jeopardize sensitive negotiations. For example, recently
the U.S. State Department expressed concern that a decision in Doe v.
Exxon Mobil could hinder U.S. cooperation with Indonesia to combat
international terrorism. 124
Similar arguments have been made by the DOJ regarding
the impact of alien tort litigation on the conduct of foreign policy
and the global war on terrorism. 125 The DOJ essentially denies
the courts any qualification to dabble into foreign policy ques-
tions. It argues that "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized
that the Constitution commits 'the entire control of interna-
tional relations' to the political Branches."'126 Thus, courts
should leave the conduct of foreign policy to the executive and
legislative arms of government. After all, foreign policy issues
are "of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, fa-
cilities nor responsibility."'127 In a similar line of reasoning, Pro-
fessor Bradley emphasizes that the "courts are not institution-
ally equipped to conduct foreign relations."'128 He notes that the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Affected by Natural Resource Exploitation: A Brief Case
Study, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 491 (2001).
123. That ATS litigation involves foreign policy-making is beyond question,
prompting some commentators to refer to the phenomenon as "plaintiffs diplomacy."
See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF.
102 (Sept.-Oct. 2000).
124. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 48.
125. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America, supra note 57, at 21.
126. Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)); see
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
127. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America, supra note 57, at 21
(quoting the Supreme Court in Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam-
ship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
128. Adam Liptak, U.S. Courts' Role in Foreign Feuds Comes Under Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at 1.
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balancing acts based on a variety of considerations that go into
executive decisions on foreign policy issues are lacking in court
actions where plaintiffs and their lawyers (and even judges)
possess neither adequate information nor the motivation to look
at the bigger picture. 129 Professor John Yoo concurs with this
point. According to him, a "court sees only the discrete case be-
fore it,"130 and does not necessarily see the "totality of the facts
of a given situation," nor is it even allowed to do so. 131 Besides,
Professor Yoo continues, "courts are only suited for deciding
right and wrong, not [measuring] costs and benefits," thus mak-
ing their foray into these foreign policy issues improper.132
ATS litigation, it is also argued, can pose serious problems
for the (ongoing) war against terrorism, since ATS claims have
been asserted against the United States and allies in that
war.133 In an Executive Opinion in the Exxon Mobil case, Wil-
liam H. Taft IV, the State Department's Legal Adviser, drew the
court's attention to the potential of the lawsuit to disrupt the ef-
forts of the United States to obtain the cooperation of Indonesia
in the fight against international terrorist activity. 134 Propo-
nents of this position argue that the ATS is a threat to U.S. se-
curity operations because the Department of Defense (DOD) re-
lies a great deal on some corporations as contractors for
"essential combat support services" in foreign countries.1 35 Con-
tractors provide equipment, training, and repair services that
are necessary for deterring or fighting war.136 Moreover, DOD
has also forged close partnerships with foreign governments in
waging the war against terrorism by contributing troops or ap-
prehending terrorists. 13 7 The manufacture and use of new
weapons systems may also be hindered while foreign training
programs could be disrupted. 138
The DOJ brief also makes the terrorism argument, but the
brief itself reveals the weakness in this argument. While argu-
ing in one breath that "the ATS... places the courts in the
129. See Bradley, supra note 15, at 460-62, 466-67.




134. See Letter from William Howard Taft, IV, supra note 40.
135. Mark E. Rosen, The Alien Tort Statute: An Emerging Threat to National
Security, at http://www.nftc.org/default/usa%20engage/ATS%20%2OAn%20E
merging%20Threat%20to%20National%2OSecurity.pdf (Aug. 2003).
136. See id. at 7.
137. See id. at 3.
138. See id.
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wholly inappropriate role of arbiters of foreign conduct, includ-
ing international law enforcement" 139 it adds: "Where Congress
wishes to permit such suits (e.g., through the TVPA), it has done
so with carefully prescribed rules and procedures. The ATS con-
tains no such limits and cannot reasonably be read as granting
the courts such unbridled authority."140 Thus, while the argu-
ment, in part, is that the courts are not proper forums for deci-
sions on foreign conduct, the very next sentence concedes that it
is not necessarily a bad idea for courts to be involved in foreign
policy-implicating international litigation, where the Congress
has granted permission for such suits. 141
The fact is that some foreign policy issues or matters that
will implicate U.S. international relations are cognizable by the
courts. 142 The crucial emphasis should be on selecting the ones
suitable for judicial intervention on a case-by-case basis.143 But
that is a different and separate question from whether the
courts are precluded from considering all cases pertaining to
customary international law on the basis that they are not
equipped to do so. Two decades ago, in a Memorandum submit-
ted by the United States as Amicus Curiae in the Filartiga case,
the government struck the right balance. "Because foreign offi-
cials are among the prospective defendants in suits alleging vio-
lations of fundamental human rights, such suits unquestionably
implicate foreign policy considerations. But not every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
139. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America, supra note 57, at 23.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Or-
ganizations, supra note 63, at 25. The Justice Department's argument to the con-
trary is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt any "inflexible and
all-encompassing rule." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(1964). It is also inconsistent with its conclusion that deference is appropriate only
when judicial resolution of the case "may hinder rather than further this country's
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere." See id. at 423.
143. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249, in which the Second Circuit warned that "not
every case 'touching on foreign relations' is nonjusticiable, and judges should not re-
flexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions
in the context of human rights." The court laid out the proper approach to follow:
We believe a preferable approach is to weigh carefully the relevant consid-
erations on a case-by-case basis. This will permit the judiciary to act where
appropriate in light of the express legislative mandate of the Congress in





On the terrorism issue, not only do ATS cases not apply to
governments, as the Supreme Court has held,145 but a blanket
exclusion of all ATS cases may end up jeopardizing the war
against terrorism since it would also shield those terrorist
groups that use the corporate form. 146 Protecting corporations
from lawsuits will insulate not just those corporations involved
in legitimate businesses but will also encompass corporations
allegedly involved in genocide and those who aid and abet
crimes against humanity.1 47
D. ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALIEN TORT LITIGATION
A hallmark of Awakening Monster is its preoccupation with
the economic implications of the continued use of the ATS to sue
multinational corporations that are based in, or have a connec-
tion to, the United States. The observation has been made that
international litigation confers some economic and non-economic
benefits on the forum State. According to Cheshire and North's
Private International Law, "[w]hen foreigners litigate in Eng-
land, this forms valuable invisible export, and confirms judicial
pride in the English legal system."148 The current wave of in-
ternational litigation in U.S. courts is viewed in some quarters
as tantamount to an export of U.S. legal values and an Ameri-
can conception of law, similar to what Britain did in the nine-
teenth century.1 49 The authors of the Awakening Monster stake
an opposite and opposing position: that cases brought by foreign
litigants under the ATS portend serious economic consequences
for the United States.1 50 They construct what they refer to as a
"nightmare scenario" that could become a reality if adequate
144. Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Or-
ganizations, supra note 63, at 26 (quoting Memorandum for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), 19 I.L.M. 602-
04).
145. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
440-41 (1989).
146. See Harold Hongju Koh, Wrong on Rights, YALE GLOBAL (July 18, 2003), at
http://yaleglobal.yale.eduldisplay.article?id=2121.
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Law Scholars and Human Rights Or-
ganizations, supra note 63, at 29.
148. SIR PETER NORTH & J. J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (13th ed. 1999).
149. See William Glaberson, U.S. Courts Become Arbiters of Global Rights and
Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2001, at Al (citing the separate views of Gregory J.
Wallance and Burt Neuborne).
150. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 1-3.
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measures are not instituted to check the disturbing trend.151
Noting that trade ties, foreign direct investment (FDI), and
extension of credit to government agencies could expose a com-
pany to liability under the ATS, the authors begin to take stock
of what such economic connections could mean for American
businesses. 152 With a U.S. FDI stock of $220 billion in target
countries and world FDI stock of about $1,365 billion in these
countries, a lot of money is involved. 53 Additionally, target
countries hold a total public debt of $1,229 billion. 154 While
some of the debt is owed to international lending agencies such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which
are immune to ATS litigation, more than half of the debt repre-
sents credit extended by private lenders. 155 Thus, these private
creditors, usually international banks, also face exposure to
suits for public and publicly guaranteed debts owed by target
countries. 56 Some insurance companies and investment trusts
are also exposed through their bond holdings. 57
The authors believe that ATS litigation could do enormous
damage to U.S. trade and foreign investment. 158 Support can be
found from both the pro-ATS and anti-ATS camps for the propo-
sition that ATS litigation operates as a form of economic sanc-
tion on countries allegedly perpetrating human rights abuses. 159
The authors use the issue of sanctions to illustrate the lurking
151. Id. at 2 ("If plaintiff lawyers prevail, [in the numerous cases pending before
the courts], today's imagined nightmare will become tomorrow's reality.").
152. Id. at 37-41.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 37.
157. Id. at 16-17.
158. See id. at 37-42.
159. See, e.g., Comment, Developments in International Law: Corporate Liability
for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2025, 2042
(2001):
It is also possible that the potential for ATCA liability would alter corpora-
tions' foreign direct investment decisions. Multinationals may choose to
stay away from countries with poor human rights records, fearing that sig-
nificant involvement would expose them to liability under the ATCA. The
potential effect of ATCA liability on corporate conduct may in turn influ-
ence the behavior of host governments. If corporations base their foreign
direct investment decisions in part on potential ATCA liability, foreign
governments trying to attract corporate investment may alter their human
rights policies. In this respect, corporate liability under the ATCA may
amount to an indirect economic sanction on foreign governments that par-




A parameter that can help size up the potential damage to trade flows
can be drawn from the analysis of economic sanctions. Gravity model
estimates indicate that extensive economic sanctions depress U.S.
trade (merchandise imports and exports) with target countries by more
than 95 percent. ATS litigation would not depress trade to nearly the
same extent, but billion-dollar awards, predicated on corporate trade
with the target country, would certainly dampen commerce. Trade
tainted with links to the foreign government-oil and mineral imports,
and exports to government agencies-would be most affected by the
ATS. 160
Going by the assumption of a ten-percent depression of
overall U.S. trade in target countries from current levels as a
result of ATS litigation, there is the possibility of a loss of $42
billion in U.S. imports and $21 billion in U.S. exports. In the
case of the industries they consider to be the most vulnerable to
ATS suits, such as oil and minerals, they envisage a 50% de-
pression in U.S. imports of oil and minerals and U.S. exports to
government agencies. This prediction translates to about $37
billion loss in U.S. imports and a $13 billion loss in U.S. ex-
ports. 161 Manufactured goods constitute the bulk of these ex-
ports. Based on data that indicate that $1 billion of manufac-
tured shipments keep approximately 8,300 U.S. manufacturing
workers employed, over 100,000 jobs could be put at risk due to
litigation under the ATS.162
The effect on foreign direct investment also seems glaring:
Adverse ATS decisions could prompt firms to disinvest en masse, as
they did during the South African apartheid era. In that episode, the
U.S. FDI stock in South Africa dropped by two-thirds. Conservatively,
we think the ATS will be less devastating but that 25 percent of U.S.
and 20 percent of world FDI (including U.S. FDI) in target countries
will be at risk.
1 63
If U.S. FDI is reduced by $55 billion in countries that have
already been targeted in ATS suits, this could endanger a
minimum of $10 billion of U.S. exports. 164 The consequence
could be a loss of up to 80,000 manufacturing jobs.165 It is not
only U.S.-based MNCs that would be affected. European and
other foreign-based MNCs doing business in the United States
160. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 37 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 38.
162. See id. at 38-39.
163. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
164. See id.
165. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 40.
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and which suffer large damage awards may divest from target
countries and-more likely-from the United States. 166 This re-
sult could jeopardize up to 130,000 jobs, which, in addition, are
usually better-paying than the average private industry jobs. 16 7
Target countries, mostly in the developing world, also face
some danger, according to the authors, as ATS suits could inflict
damage on them through curtailment of trade, investment, and
access to credit. 168 The authors emphasize the importance of
trade as "an engine of world growth" since the Second World
War and add that depriving a country of trade opportunities can
invite harm to that country's economic prospects.1 69 The Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce has also brought attention to
the possibility of the ATS impeding investment abroad by U.S.
companies and reducing investment in the United States by for-
eign companies. 170 The State Department's opinion in the
Exxon Mobil case also stated that the lawsuit could affect Indo-
nesia's economy, with adverse implications for U.S. interests. 171
The Government of South Africa appears to echo some of
these views. In a July 15, 2003 letter by the South African Min-
ister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Dr. Penuell M.
Maduna, to U.S. District Court Judge John E. Sprizzo, urging
the dismissal of an ATS lawsuit, the minister stated: "Permit-
ting this litigation to go forward will, in the government's view,
discourage much-needed direct foreign investment in South Af-
rica and thus delay the achievement of our central goals." 172
Another adverse economic effect is the competitive disad-
vantage faced by multinational corporations based in the United
States or having sufficient connection thereto to make them
amenable to ATS suits.1 73 For instance, in the Unocal litigation,
the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Unocal's partner,
166. See id. at 41.
167. See id. at 42.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Bruno, supra note 33.
171. Letter from William H. Taft, TV, supra note 40.
172. Rosen, supra note 135, at 10 (quoting "Declaration" to Judge E. Sprizzo,
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, from South African Minis-
ter of Justice and Constitutional Development Dr. Penuell M. Maduna, July 15,
2003).
173. See Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conven-
iens, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (contending that the courts, by entertaining




the French oil company Total. 174 A counter-contention holds
that the competitiveness of American companies should not be
promoted by allowing them to partake in criminal activity since
doing so would be morally repugnant. 175 This is strictly beside
the point. The issue is not whether American companies de-
serve to be protected if they insist on joining forces with those
who perpetrate atrocity, but about allowing equally culpable
corporations from other countries to go scot-free and use their
immunity to gain an advantage over American companies. One
is hard pressed to find the sense of fairness and justice behind
that logic.
Further, U.S. laws penalizing U.S. corporations that engage
in bribery abroad have been said to place U.S. companies at a
competitive disadvantage, yet hardly anybody argues for a re-
peal of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.176 Again, there are
several holes in this argument. First, other corporate home
countries have come out strongly against corruption under the
aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), thus making the argument moot. 177 Second,
the FCPA certainly conferred a competitive disadvantage, and
this point was stridently made. 78 Yet, while there is a prohibi-
tion of foreign bribery in the law books, the danger has not been
very real. Thus, the FCPA does not seem to pose as much a
business risk as exposure to litigation under the ATS. 179 Given
a choice between placing companies at a competitive disadvan-
tage and holding them liable for human rights abuses, one
would gladly opt for corporate liability and accountability. But
framing the issue this way masks the fact that other choices ex-
ist or could be explored. For instance, uniform application of
174. Many years later, in 2002, a lawsuit was instituted in France against Total.
The fact that Total enjoyed freedom from suits for about six years while Unocal
fought in U.S. courts is a huge advantage. Besides, this type of case is quite new in
France and certainly the chances of success may not be very high. For more infor-
mation on the Total case in France, see Nicholas Revise, Total, Objet d'une Plainte
en France Pour Travail Force en Birmanie, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 29, 2002.
175. Human Rights Watch, Myths and Facts About the Alien Tort Claims Act,
available at http://hrw.org/campaigns/atca/myths.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
176. Id.
177. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
178. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Glob-
alization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 288 (1999).
179. See Corporate Ethics: Big Oil's Dirty Secrets, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at
53 (asserting that corporate executives have been skirting and weakening the FCPA
through middlemen and law firms, mostly based in London).
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sanctions would promote corporate liability without competitive
disadvantage.
The discussion of economic costs is by far the book's strong-
est suit. It is important to examine the potential impact of liti-
gation on the economy generally and more specifically on the
MNCs and the labor force. As the authors observe, the asbestos
industry was bankrupted out of existence through mass tort
litigation. 180 While the effects of ATS lawsuits may not be that
far-reaching, it is still important to examine how perilous they
could be. This possibility calls for more in-depth studies from
both sides, especially if damage awards, which have not been
made to date in corporate suits, become a reality.
Dismissing these concerns as an attempt to protect the cor-
porate "fat cats" is unhelpful and only inflames the rhetoric. It
could be that at the end of the day, society would view the pro-
tection of human rights as an overwhelming consideration that
trumps business interests, regardless of cost. But it could also
be that society will seek a balance or look for less costly means
of accomplishing the objective. These decisions cannot properly
be made without a thorough analysis based on solid and reliable
data. At the moment, such a decision may be difficult to make,
since many of the cases are still in their infancy. In fact, corpo-
rations do not seem to be under a great deal of apprehension, al-
though they are cautiously looking at developments in this area.
As Human Rights Watch has observed, ATS lawsuits com-
menced against Shell in 1997 and Chevron in 1999 concerning
their operations in Nigeria did not stop the two corporations
from making multi-year, multi-billion dollar investments in that
country from 1999.181 Nevertheless, it is a good thing that we
are having this debate.
III. POLICY PROPOSALS
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The authors decry the patchwork of ad hoc solutions that
have been put in place so far to address the problems (perceived
to be) generated by, or associated with, the ATS. Examples in-
clude the opinions sought by the courts from the State Depart-
ment in the Exxon Mobil and Rio Tinto cases, statements from
180. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 14.
181. Human Rights Watch, supra note 175.
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the Treasury Department, and actions by the Justice Depart-
ment. The authors call on the three departments to issue a joint
statement calling on the courts to interpret the statute as a ju-
risdictional statute, until such time as Congress expands the
scope of the ATS by enumerating other causes of action. The
authors, however, do not have much confidence in the courts to
provide the right solutions to this problem any time soon.
Therefore, the book places the ultimate resolution of this
matter at the feet of Congress. 8 2 Asserting that "Congress
must act," the authors propose a range of policy prescriptions to
address the problem. 8 3 These proposals follow the lines of the
TVPA and include defining the ATS cause of action and limiting
its use to a short list containing widely recognized international
norms such as slavery, piracy, genocide, torture, war crimes, ex-
tra judicial killings and forced labor.'8 4 Jurisdiction should also
be vested in federal courts alone; state courts should be ex-
cluded.'8 5 Claimants should exhaust local remedies in the coun-
tries where the cause of action arose before being eligible to sue
in U.S. courts. 8 6 There should also be a ten-year statute of
limitations. 8 7
B. ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS
A Congressional resolution of this matter would certainly be
welcome. There are reasons, however, to believe that it will not
be a realistic resolution in the near future. A piece of legislation
that will satisfy both sides of this controversy will be difficult to
craft. Even if the business community gets its wish and suc-
ceeds in eviscerating or repealing the ATS, this species of litiga-
tion against multinational corporations will by no means disap-
pear. Smart lawyers will continue to devise ways to hold
182. The authors are not alone in espousing this view. In an editorial, the
Washington Post forcefully stated:
We bow to no one in our contempt for the Burmese junta, and we can cer-
tainly imagine a law that would enable lawsuits like the one pending
against Unocal. But such a decision is Congress's to make. The courts
should not pretend that the legislature spoke to this question 200 years
ago.
Policing Human Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at A18.
183. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 55.
184. Id.
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multinational corporations accountable in U.S. courts.188 Fac-
tors that draw litigants to U.S. courts and away from their
countries' judicial forums remain. One scholar summarizes the
raison d'etre for international civil litigation as follows: "Gov-
ernance deficits in host countries, substantive differences be-
tween legal systems, the possibility of higher damages awards
being awarded in home rather than host countries, and innova-
tive strategies on the part of plaintiffs' lawyers all play a role in
the emergence of foreign direct liability cases." 189
In addition, the United States' legal structure holds advan-
tages that are peculiar to the country. The ATS is a unique
piece of legislation, the equivalent of which does not exist in
other countries. 190 U.S. personal jurisdiction rules have enough
flexibility to enable suits against defendants who are only tem-
porarily in the country. Foreign corporations whose presence in
the United States is minimal compared with the volume of op-
erations elsewhere can still be sued in the United States. Plain-
tiffs also do not need to show any connection between the events
in question and the United States. 91 While other countries like
Sweden (the Umbrella Rule) 192 have jurisdictional rules as lib-
eral as, if not more liberal than, the rules applicable in the
United States, the United States still holds advantages because
its rules are better aligned to institute human rights claims by
non-citizens for violations occurring in a foreign country.193 The
loser-pays system that applies in some countries, and which
could dampen the desire to litigate cases of this magnitude, does
not apply in the United States.
Moreover, a huge network of public interest lawyers and
private law firms that provide pro bono assistance, which hardly
188. Schrage, supra note 52, at 156.
189. Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through
National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 451, 462 (2001).
190. Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Do-
mestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 409 (2001) (stating that
"[n]o other country has a statute that creates a specific statutory claim for human
rights violations").
191. Id.
192. The "umbrella rule," which is applicable in such countries as Germany and
Sweden, attaches jurisdiction to a person because of the mere presence in the coun-
try of an object belonging to that person that may even be of the slightest value. For
a discussion of the rule, see Harold L. Korn, The Development of Judicial Jurisdic-
tion in the United States: Part I, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 967 (1999); Brian Pearce,
Note, The Comity Doctrine as a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U.S.-E. U. Com-
parison, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 525, 542 (1994).
193. Stephens, supra note 190, at 410-11.
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exists in most of the world, also plays a key role in facilitating
this kind of litigation.194 Plaintiffs' attorneys are able to enter
into attractive contingency fee arrangements that enable them
to take up suits, but such arrangements are not the norm in
many countries and are not available in a large number of
them.195
In addition, the notice pleading system and discovery rules
in the United States are so liberal that they allow plaintiffs to
bring suits based on minimal facts with ample room to flesh
them out later. This system works to a plaintiffs advantage.
The burden is on the defendant to produce relevant documents
or materials in his or her possession or control, which the plain-
tiff can use to boost his or her case. 196 The class action vehicle,
generous punitive damages, and the use of jurors, who often
tend to sympathize with ordinary folks whom they view as help-
less victims of the Godzilla-like corporations, to determine liabil-
ity and damages are also attractive features. 197 Another useful
observation that can be made here is that the United States has
a long tradition of using "public law litigation" 198 to affect social
issues or affect social reform. This legal culture is quite at home
with lawsuits that seek to improve the way corporations do
business and provide justice for victims. 199 It is little wonder
that the United States is considered a "plaintiffs paradise"
given the many advantages that it bestows on plaintiffs without
attendant risk, while saddling the defendant with enormous
costs, financial and otherwise.20 0
Apart from these structural advantages, lawsuits in the
United States generate enormous publicity and provide oppor-
tunities for the exposure of human rights violations abroad that
would ordinarily attract only scant attention.201 This publicity,
194. Id. at 411.
195. Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Out-
side of the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 381, 394 (2001).
196. Stephens, supra note 190, at 412.
197. Mattei & Lena, supra note 195, at 394-95.
198. The late Professor Abram Chayes coined this expression almost thirty years
ago. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976).
199. Stephens, supra note 190, at 413.
200. Mattei & Lena, supra note 195, at 393. For additional discussion of the
unique, attractive features of the American legal system, see Beth Stephens, Trans-
lating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Reme-
dies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (2002).
201. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 123, at 106.
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in turn, comes with a number of potential or real advantages.
With the intense publicity generated by the lawsuits, the pres-
sure on abusive governments to reform their practices may be
increased.202 Public disclosure could also serve as a deterrent
against the commission or perpetration of human rights abuses
by State officials in the countries involved or elsewhere. 203 Offi-
cials may also be confronted with the reality that they will not
be able to use the United States as a safe haven in the future,
making them reflect deeply before violating the rights of fellow
citizens. 204
It is in light of the foregoing facts that I make the following
additional proposals. I proceed on the understanding that there
is general agreement that genocide, war crimes, and other grave
international law violations are wrong and that corporations
should not be participating in or encouraging them. The re-
maining issue then is how to ensure that corporations which de-
viate from the norm are held properly liable, but in a manner
that imposes the least cost on all.
1. Strengthening Legal Institutions in Other Countries
Litigation to hold companies accountable could proceed in
countries where the alleged violations took place, if adequate in-
stitutions are available. Often, they are not. This factor and
others explain the attractiveness of U.S. courts. When some of
the benefits of this type of litigation are made available in other
countries or host country forums become more attractive, corpo-
rate accountability litigation can take place there. This ap-
proach was recently adopted in the case brought by Ecuadorian
citizens against ChevronTexaco. 205 After years of litigation in
federal courts in New York, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
cases, subject to ChevronTexaco accepting the jurisdiction of
Ecuador's courts. 20 6 To strengthen the process, judgment ob-
tained from these foreign courts can also be enforced in the
United States.207
This approach has a host of benefits. First, thousands of
litigants who cannot journey to New York or afford the costs of
202. Bradley, supra note 15, at 459.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Juan Forero, Texaco Goes on Trial in Ecuador Pollution Case, N.Y.





litigating in a U.S. forum will now have their day in court. The
Ecuadorian cases will also likely incorporate environmental
claims, which are generally not cognizable under the ATS.208
Finally, litigation in Ecuador will present opportunities for na-
tive legal institutions and the legal profession to further develop
and function more effectively. There is, of course, the concern as
to whether Ecuadorian law and institutions are equal to this
task. The U.S. government ought to embrace the move toward
corporate liability litigation outside the United States and pro-
vide support to build the capacity of existing institutions in for-
eign countries.
2. International Regulation of Multinational Corporations
Notwithstanding the advantages the U.S. legal system pro-
vides, ATS litigation still may not be the most effective means of
promoting human rights and checking corporate abuses in vari-
ous parts of the world. ATS litigation is riddled with a number
of bottlenecks that a potential plaintiff must confront. 20 9 Some
of these hurdles include the requirements of standing and per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, forum non conveniens,210
and the doctrine of comity.2 11
Further, subject matter jurisdiction under the statute is
limited to a small number of norms of customary international
law and jus cogens, and does not cover all human rights and en-
vironmental abuses. 212 In particular, courts have been reluctant
208. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that the environmental violations in reference did not constitute violations of the
law of nations).
209. For an extensive discussion of these obstacles, see FRANK NEWMAN &
DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS
794-818 (3d ed. 2001).
210. It should be noted, however, that while the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens can be a major obstacle to a plaintiff, "any defendant seeking dismissal in favor
of a foreign forum bears a substantial burden of proof," which may be difficult to sat-
isfy in order to justify the dismissal of a suit. Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor
Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1577 (1998) (reviewing
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lance A. Compa &
Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996)).
211. Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Hu-
man Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
145, 146 (1999) ("[Forum non conveniens] and the doctrine of comity have a powerful
hold on U.S. federal courts and have frequently been held to be sufficient grounds
for dismissal of foreigners' complaints.").
212. Id. at 146, 154.
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to extend the ATS to environmental harms. 213 Foreign claim-
ants must explore other bases for subject matter jurisdiction,
even when human rights and environmental abuses are in-
volved.214 The importance of environmental claims is high-
lighted by the fact that many of the allegations of corporate
misdeeds center on environmental abuses. Some scholars be-
lieve that the ATS should cover environment-related cases on
the grounds that a right to a clean environment exists in inter-
national law. 215 Even cases that fit the ATS rarely make their
way to U.S. courts because of financial costs and other con-
straints. Thus, many victims are left without an effective rem-
edy.
Moreover, concentrating litigation in the United States ob-
viously exacts a cost on the U.S. judicial system, which could po-
tentially overwhelm the courts and impose costs on taxpayers.
Such consequences could be grounds for potential backlash.216
Other countries may see the United States as assuming the role
of the world's attorney and judge, and may resent such a pos-
ture.21 7
In view of the foregoing, it may be useful to consider "uni-
formalizing and internationalizing regulations and sanctions in
relation to multinational corporations."218 Through the interna-
tional legal system, multinational corporations can be regu-
lated.219 Clearly defined rights and corresponding responsibili-
213. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Flores v. S. Peru Cop-
per Corp., 343 F.3d at 140.
214. See Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 211, at 146.
215. Wagner, supra note 122.
216. At the moment, the courts have been able to manage the caseload and the
number of lawsuits has not risen to overwhelming numbers. See Hon. John M.
Walker, Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights Violations Under the
Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 539, 539 (1997) ("It is safe to say that, quan-
titatively, international human rights law is not a major, or even a minor, compo-
nent of the business of federal courts: it is a miniscule part of what we do."); see also
Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 485, 491 n.22 (2001). If the current trend continues, however, the possibility
of an avalanche of cases is not remote.
217. See South African President Thabo Mbeki's statement before his country's
Parliament on April 15, 2003: 'We consider it completely unacceptable that matters
that are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts
which bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country and the observance of
the perspective contained in our constitution of the promotion of national reconcilia-
tion." Rosen, supra note 135, at 11 (quoting President Thabo Mbeki).
218. DURUIGBO, supra note 19, at 204.
219. The authors of Awakening Monster also support some form of international
regulation through enforceable codes of conduct with a cap on punitive damages.
But they say that the possibility of such an arrangement soon becoming a reality is
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ties will be attached to them and breaches of their obligations
would be actionable in domestic courts of the plaintiffs choice.
This arrangement, which could be under a treaty, would man-
date parties to streamline their judicial systems to have some of
the attractive features of the U.S. legal system, while dropping
the bottlenecks and limitations that are inherent in or associ-
ated with U.S. practice.
The import of this proposal is a restructuring of the interna-
tional legal system. The current structure of international law
is States-centric. 220  At least since the nineteenth century,
States have occupied a central role in the international sphere
and were viewed as the only subjects of international law. 221
Over the years, the dominance of the State has been whittled
down and non-State actors, including international organiza-
tions222 and individuals (to a limited extent)223 have been ac-
cepted as subjects of international law. This expansion of the
subjects of international law, however, has not reached multina-
tional corporations. 224 There is a growing clamor for a change in
this area and recently, the United Nations Sub-Commission on
Human Rights introduced a set of norms to govern the activities
of corporations in relation to labor rights, human rights, and
environmental protection. 225 There are questions as to whether
these changes go far enough. It is likely that there will continue
quite remote. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 6, at 53.
220. See J.L. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 1 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963); Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Indi-
viduals, 50 AM. J. INTL L. 533, 534 (1956).
221. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed.
2003).
222. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79 (Apr. 11) (advisory opinion).
223. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 639 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 LAw Q. REV. 97,
117-19 (1948).
224. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at 67; CHRIS N. OKEKE,
CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE NEW ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR TREATY-
MAKING CAPACITY (1974); IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1994).
225. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. ECN.4ISub.2/2003/12Rev.2 (2003),
available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc-id=7440 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004). For a commentary on the Norms, see David Weissbrodt & Muria
Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003).
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to be calls for direct or quasi-regulation of MNCs in interna-
tional law.
While there is little likelihood that the Nation-state will
disappear in the foreseeable future,226 there needs to be an ac-
knowledgement of the fact that the influence of MNCs in the
global scheme has grown exponentially. The rise of MNCs has
diluted the power of States. 227 A large number of States lack
the ability, capacity or inclination to control the activities of
MNCs in their territory,228 making a supranational structure to
handle these issues necessary. This would be a win-win solu-
tion, as the investment interests of MNCs should also be given
adequate legal protection under this arrangement. Neverthe-
less, there may be obstacles to accomplishing this, such as def-
erence to the notion of sovereignty. 229 The ability of the interna-
tional community to navigate through these constraints and
establish a new order that ensures that international business
is not conducted in a way that places an unbridled pursuit of
profits above everything else may be one of the closely watched
issues of the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
Awakening Monster is well written in a language that flows
and is easy to follow. The arguments are carefully presented
and the points are cogently made. However, the authors do not
undertake a deep exploration of the legal arguments that pres-
ently pervade the subject of ATS litigation. 230 Nevertheless,
226. Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 22 (1998).
227. See Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 37 (2000) (attributing the weakening of nation-states to the
phenomenon of globalization).
228. See Emeka Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and Compliance with
International Regulations Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 101, 139 (2001); J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an
Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle
for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U. INT'L L, REV. 851, 902-03 (2003).
229. For a discussion of the obstacles to direct or quasi-regulation of MNCs in
international law, see DURUIGBO, supra note 19, at 202-03.
230. Apart from the arguments examined herein, another area of great contro-
versy is whether customary international law is part of federal common law. If cus-
tomary international law is not, it calls into serious doubt the ability of the federal
courts to continue to apply that body of law through ATS litigation. For the diver-
gent positions on this issue, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Fed-
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what the book lacks in rigorous legal analysis, it compensates
for in economic analysis and policy prescription. The economic
arguments are based on publicly verifiable data, although the
conclusions drawn from the data are somewhat conjectural and
quite speculative. Some of the policy changes recommended are
reasonable but, realistically speaking, have little chance of re-
ceiving the wide acceptance that would be helpful in translating
them into law.
It bears mentioning, however, that the book is a fairly one-
sided-verging on the polemical-attack on the ATS, a fact that
is clearly conveyed by the title. Although the authors make use
of public data, it is important to note that there is no direct data
from which one could infer the effects the book bemoans, as
suits against corporate defendants are too recent and too few to
produce any clearly observable facts. The data on which the au-
thors rely seem to be a fairly ungrounded prediction, based in
part on dubious analogies to other economically chilling devel-
opments, and in part on the authors' own speculation. One
must therefore sound a strong cautionary note for the reader as
consumer of this data.
ATS litigation has been a revolutionary development in this
epoch. The implications are huge. ATS litigation "provides one
possible solution to the present day inability to hold an MNC ac-
countable for human rights violations."231 Even if the cases do
not succeed, they will have succeeded in making the companies
expend substantial resources to fight the lawsuits and burnish
their public image. Their stock could also experience a drop in
the capital markets if bad publicity or risk of liability grows.
Indeed, with the specter of suits looming, or cases actually pro-
ceeding, corporations have had a major incentive to work with
human rights groups in order to change their practices. 232
The suits have also provided a measure of satisfaction to
those who ascribe to a number of fundamental principles, in-
eral Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260
(1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context
in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, Interna-
tional Law as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 187
(2001); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).
231. Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be
Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927, 937 (1998).
232. A Needed Human Rights Law, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at A16.
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cluding the notions of justice for all and equality before the
law.2 33 Allowing corporations and State officials to escape liabil-
ity for their acts simply because they occurred in countries
without adequate legal structures to address them does damage
to the concept of Rule of Law 234 and defeats the whole idea that
where there is a breach of a legal right, a remedy must at-
tach.235 Similarly, even where there are no monetary damages
or such damages are not collectible, or the judgment is not en-
forceable, a favorable judgment emanating from a U.S. court
may be a source of moral vindication and psychological redress
for victims of human rights abuses and other atrocities.236
For countries from which these cases originate, it repre-
sents an indictment on their legal systems and institutions.
This may prompt them to improve. It also holds implications for
public international law in the sense that it gives teeth to inter-
national legal provisions. A major criticism of international law
is the lack of enforcement of its dictates.237 ATS litigation pro-
vides some form of enforcement mechanism, even when the en-
forcement is not directly against the primary subjects of inter-
national law, States, but against arguably non-legal persons in
international law. 238
Nevertheless, ATS litigation has limitations that lessen its
effectiveness as a tool for redressing wrongs to victims of human
rights and environmental abuse. The U.S. government and the
business community should focus less on weakening the ATS
233. See James E. Post, Global Codes of Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and Man-
agers in Search of a Solution, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME
HAS COME 103 (Oliver F. Williams, ed., 2000) ("We have sought to make a difference
in our organizations, our communities, and our professions. Our commitments may
have stemmed from frustrations, recognition of an injustice, or issues so fundamen-
tal to our beliefs and values as human beings that we felt compelled to act.").
234. The idea of equality before the law is a component of the doctrine of rule of
law. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
198 (8th ed. 1915).
235. The principle of ubi ius ibi remedium is an honored one in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 109 (1765) cited in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("For it is a settled and invariable principle ...
that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal
and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP L. REV. 1, 13 (2001); Reinhard Zimmermann, Ro-
man-Dutch Jurisprudence And Its Contribution To European Private Law, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 1685, 1696 (1992).
236. Bradley, supra note 15, at 459.
237. See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Reforming the International Law and Pol-
icy on Marine Oil Pollution, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 79-80 (2000) and sources cited
therein.
238. See DURUIGBO, supra note 19, at 189-95.
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and concentrate more on policy changes that would strengthen
legal institutions in host countries and encourage corporate
regulation in international law. These changes would ensure
justice while removing or reducing unwanted competitive disad-
vantages and other avoidable economic costs currently associ-
ated with alien tort litigation.
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